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FOREWORD
This is one of a set of seven reports, each one describing the
results, for a particular subsystem, of a study titled "An Engineering
Study of Onboard Checkout Techniques. " Under the general title of
"A Guide to Onboard Checkout," the reports are as follows.
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Section 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 OBJECTIVE
With the advent of large scale aerospace systems, designers have recognized
the importance of specifying and meeting design requirements additional to the
classical functional and environmental requirements. These "additional" require-
ments include producibility, safety, reliability, quality, and maintainability.
These criteria have been identified, grown into prominence, and become disciplines
in their own right. Presently, it is inconceivable that any aerospace system/
equipment design requirements would be formulated without consideration of
these criteria.
The complexity, sophistication and duration of future manned space missions
demand that still another criterion needs to be considered in the formulation of
system/equipment requirements. The concept of "checkoutability" denotes the
adaptability of a system, subsystem, or equipment to a controlled checkout pro-
cess. As with other requirements, it should also apply from the time of early
design concept formulation.
The results of "An Engineering Study of Onboard Checkout Techniques" and
other studies indicate that for an extended space mission onboard checkout is
mandatory and applicable to all subsystems of the space system. In order to use
it effectively, "checkoutability" should be incorporated into the design of each
subsystem, beginning with initial performance requirements.
Conferences with researchers, system engineers and subsystem specialists
in the course of the basic Onboard Checkout Techniques Study revealed an extensive
interest in the idea of autonomous onboard checkout. Designers are motivated to
incorporate "checkoutability" into their subsystem designs but express a need for
information and guidance that will enable them to do so efficiently.
It is the objective of this report to present the results of the basic study as
they relate to one space subsystem to serve as a guide, by example, to those who
in the future need to implement onboard checkout in a similar subsystem. It is not
practicable to formulate a firm set of instructions or recipes, because operational
requirements, which vary widely among systems, normally determine the check-
out philosophy. It is suggested that the reader study this report as a basis from
which to build his own approach to "checkoutability. "
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1.2 BASIC STUDY SUMMARY
1.2.1 STUDY OBJECTIVE
The basic study was aimed at identification and evaluation of techniques for
achieving the following capabilities in the operational Space Station/Base, under
control of the Data Management System (DMS), with minimal crew intervention.
* Automated failure prediction and detection
* Automated fault isolation
* Failure correction
* Onboard electronic maintenance
1.2.2 STUDY BASELINE
The study started in July 1970. The system design baseline was established
by the Space Station Phase B study results as achieved by the McDonnell-Douglas/
IBM team, modified in accordance with technical direction from NASA-MSC. The
overall system configuration was the 33-foot diameter, four-deck, 12-man station.
Individual subsystem baseline descriptions are given in their respective "Guide to
Onboard Checkout" reports.
1. 2.3 STUDY TASKS
The basic study comprised five tasks. Primary emphasis was given to
Task 1, Requirements Analysis and Concepts. This task established subsystem
baseline descriptions and then analyzed them to determine their reliability/main-
tainability characteristics (criticality, failure modes and effects, maintenance
concepts and line replaceable unit (LRU) definitions), checkout strategies, test
definitions, and definitions of stimuli and measurements. After software pre-
liminary designs were available, an analysis of checkout requirements on the DMS
was performed.
A software task was performed to determine the software requirements
dictated by the results of Task 1.
Task 3 was a study of onboard electronic maintenance requirements and
recommendations of concepts to satisfy them. Supporting research and technology
tasks leading to an onboard maintenance capability were identified. The study
implementation plan and recommendations for implementing results of the study
were developed in Task 4. The task final report also summarizes results of the
study in all technical tasks.
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Reliability, Task 5, was very limited in scope, resulting in an analysis of
failure modes and effects in three Space Station subsystems, GN&C, DMS (computer
group) and RF communications.
1.2.4 PREVIOUS REPORTS
Results of the basic study were reported by task in the following reports,
under the general title of "An Engineering Study of Onboard Checkout Techniques,
Final Report. "
IBM Number Title
71W-00111
71W-00112
71W-00113
71W-00114
71W-00115
Task 1: Requirements Analysis and Concepts
Task 2: Software
Task 3: Onboard Maintenance
Task 4: Summary and Recommendations
Task 5: Subsystem Level Failure Modes and
Effects
1-3/1-4
Section 2
BASELINE SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS
2.1 GENERAL
This section describes the baseline Environmental Control and Life Support
(EC/LS) subsystem which was analyzed to define onboard checkout requirements.
In order to assess requirements for onboard checkout, descriptions at the sub-
system level and the assembly level are required, as well as the major interfaces
between subsystems.
The assembly level description for each of the subsystems (MSFC-DRL-160,
Line Item 13) provided the primary working document for subsystem analysis. To
reduce documentation, these documents have been incorporated by reference into
this report where applicable. Therefore, where no significant differences exist
from the Phase B definition, this report contains a brief subsystem description
and an identification of the referenced document containing the assembly level
descriptions for the subsystem. Where significant differences do exist, the sub-
system level description includes these changes in as much detail as is available.
MSFC-DRL-160, Line Item 19, provided the major subsystem interface descrip-
tions for analysis of integrated test requirements.
2.2 SUBSYSTEM LEVEL DESCRIPTION
The EC/LS Subsystem provides cabin atmosphere control and purification,
water and waste management, pressure suit support, and thermal control for the
entire Space Station.
The atmosphere is nearly that at sea level; however, in accordance with the
guidelines and constraints, the system is designed to operate in a variable atmos-
phere of 10. 0 to 14. 7 psi, with a partial pressure of oxygen constant at 3. 1 psi,
regardless of the total pressure.
Two 12 -man subsystems are provided, one for the compartment (defined
as a volume of space enclosed by pressure-resistant structure) which includes
decks 1 and 2, and one for the compartment that includes decks 3 and 4. The
tunnel can be referenced to either subsystem.
The subsystem provided has full H 0 recovery; that is, more water is re-
covered in the Space Station than is required for drinking and washing. The sub-
system also has partial 02 recovery; the shortage is made up by water contained
in the food.
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The EC/LS Subsystem provides methane and unreacted CO2 to the Propul-
sion Subsystem which uses these gases as propellants for orbitkeeping and control-
moment gyro desaturation.
The total heat generated in the Space Station is rejected to space through a
segmented radiator integrated with the micrometeoroid shield independently of
the heat distribution between compartments.
The assemblies provided in decks 1-2 and decks 3-4 each have the capa-
bility to support 12 men. The tunnel atmosphere can be interchanged with either
system through the valving and interconnecting ducting; however, the atmosphere
for decks 1-2 and that for decks 3-4 are not intermixed normally through the
ventilation system. Cross-linking between assemblies is provided, however, to
allow one assembly to serve as an installed spare for the other.
If a major emergency occurs, such as a fire, decompression, or massive
contamination, it will affect only the atmosphere in half of the Space Station. The
crew will always be able to live in the other compartment within the time limit
established by the amount of consumables on board at the time of the emergency.
This concept also easily accommodates the 24-man crew during the overlap period.
The thermal control circuits are also designed to be completely independent so
that if fire disables the heat-transport loops in either compartment, it does not
affect the entire Space Station.
Cooling and heating requirements are satisfied independently for each of the
Space Station common modules and to minimize the probability of a full loss of the
Thermal Control System. However, controls are also provided whereby these
heating and cooling loads may be accommodated independently of their distribution
between common modules. As a limit, either common module system can accom-
modate full crew and electrical loads. Because all critical electrical equipment
is duplicated within the two common modules, thermal control capability is es-
sentially duplicated. One limitation is that total available radiator area is neces-
sary to reject total cooling loads under design environmental conditions. For
this reason and because radiator failures may be difficult to repair, full redun-
dancy is provided in the radiator circuitry. Segmentation and circuit isolation
further protect against major Thermal Control System loss.
2.3 ASSEMBLY LEVEL DESCRIPTIONS
Descriptions of the EC/LS Subsystem assemblies are provided in the Space
Station MSFC-DRL-160, Line Item 13, Volume I, Book 3, Crew Systems. These
descriptions include block diagrams, discussions of assembly groups, assemblies,
and major subassemblies, physical characteristics summary, and interface de-
scriptions. DRL 13, Volume I, Book 2, is incorporated by reference into this
report as a detailed description of the EC/LS Subsystem assembly group, assem-
blies, and major subassemblies will become the primary working document for
further analysis.
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Section 3
RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY ANALYSES
3.1 CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
As a guide to emphasis in subsequent checkout technique studies, an analysis
has been made of the overall subsystem and major component criticality (failure
probability) of the Space Station subsystems and equipment. As an input to the
Checkout Requirements Analysis Task, this data along with the failure mode and
effects data will be useful in determining test priorities and test scheduling.
Additionally, this data will aid in optimizing checkout system design to ensure
that confidence of failure detection is increased in proportion to added system
complexity and cost.
3.1.1 CRITICALITY ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
A criticality number (related to failure probability) was generated for each
major subsystem component. This number is the product of: (1) the component
failure rate (or the reciprocal of mean-time-between-failure), (2) the component's
anticipated usage or duty cycle, and (3) an orbital time period of six months, or
4, 380 hours. Six months was chosen as the time period of interest to allow one
missed resupply on the basis of normal resupply occurring at three-month intervals.
The criticality number, then, is the failure expectation for a particular component
over any six-month time period.
For visibility, the major components of each subsystem analyzed have been
ordered according to the magnitude of their criticality numbers. This number,
however, should not be considered as an indication of the real risk involved, since
it does not take into account such factors as redundant components, subsystem
maintainability, and the alternate operational procedures available.
Overall subsystem criticality has been determined by a computerized
optimization process whereby spares and redundancy are considered in terms of
a trade-off between increased reliability and weight. This determination, there-
fore, reflects not only the failure probability of subsystem components, but also
the probability that a spare or redundant component may not be available to
restore the subsystem to operational status. The methodology used is described
in Section 9, Long-Life Assurance Study Results, DRL 13 (Preliminary Subsystem
Design Data), Volume III (Supporting Analyses), Book 4 (Safety/Long Life/Test
Philosophy) from the MDAC Phase B Space Station Study. Component-level failure
mode and criticality data are presented in subsequent paragraphs.
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3.1.2 SUBSYSTEM CRITICALITY DATA
The Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem (EC/LS) has a six-
month reliability of 0. 997 and requires 1, 780 pounds of spares for its achievement.
An ordered ranking of EC/LS component criticality is provided in Table 3-1.
Two completely independent EC/LS subsystems exist onboard the Space
Station, either of which is capable of supporting the crewmen for extended periods
of time. Table 3-1 ranks EC/LS components in an artificial worst case environ-
ment reflecting nonexistence of any backup system, but also provides conditional
criticalities assuming the availability to both the backup subsystem and spares.
3.2 FAILURE EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FEA)
Based upon the baseline subsystem descriptions, each major subsystem com-
ponent was assessed to determine its most probable failure mode(s), and the
"mission effect" associated with this failure mode(s). The "mission effect" is
noted to provide a brief explanation of Space Station behavior if the particular
failure mode should occur (e. g., experiments degraded, crew hazard, etc. ). The
explanation generally does not, however, consider the offsetting effects of backup
redundancy or spares since there would be practically "no effect" if these factors
were considered.
In addition, the effect of failure is categorized into the following criticality
classes:
(a) Category I - Failure could cause a loss of life.
(b) Category II - Failure could cause the loss of a primary mission objective.
(c) Category III - Failure could cause the loss of a secondary mission
objective.
(d) Category IV - Failure results in only a nuisance.
In most cases, Category II and Category III failures are not distinguishable
because primary and secondary mission objectives have not been identified to the
level of detail required to permit such separation.
Two completely independent EC/LS subsystems exist on board the Space
Station, either of which is capable of supporting the crewmen for extended periods
of time. The number of units indicated in Table 3-2 (a partial listing included only
to serve as an example) shows the total quantity of components utilized in both
EC/LS subsystems (not including spares). The mission-effects noted in Table 3-2
reflect the non-existence of any backup subsystem and therefore depict artificial
worst case conditions.
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Table 3-1. EC/LS Criticality Ranking (Highest 25 Components)
Single Unit Conditioned
Component Criticality Loss Criticality Remarks
(10-6) (10-6)
2590 Electrolysis 675, 000 150 includes
Module
6304 Pump/Motor
6604 Pump/Motor
6104 Pump/Motor
2341 CO2 Compressor
1302 Pressure Control
2231 Fan
2242 Fan
2241 Fan
2140 Fan
2340 Fan
2642 Fan
6 spares
146, 000
146, 000
146, 000
86,000
83,000
47,500
47,500
47, 500
47, 500
47,500
47, 50047 /50
73
73
73
750
100
100
o
I
w
Co Table 3-1. EC/LS Criticality Ranking
Single Unit
Component Criticality
(10-6)
2370 Valve, Sequence
Controller
2302 CO02 Diverter Valve
2304 Silica Gel Diverter
Valve
3205 Mal Sieve Diverter
Valve
3370 Control
3314 Valve, Temp
Control
2141 Water Pump
3340 Pump
2440 Condensate Pump
2571 Current Controller
1805 Rotating Com-
pressor
43,800
43,800
43, 800
43,800
43,600
40, 000
37,000
37,000
36, 800
32, 000
26, 200
(Highest 25 Components) (Continued)
Conditioned
Loss Criticality
(10-6)
10
10
10
10
10
7
105
105
105
44
200
Remarks
Table 3-2. Environmental Control and Life Support
(A)
MTBF/Source
Failure Mission Failure No. of Thousands
Mode(s) Effect Category Units of Hours
1101-1 Tank, 02 Gas
Storage
1102 Flow Restrictor,
Gas Storage
1103 Shutoff Valve,
Gas Storage
1104 Quick Discon-
nect, Gas
Storage
1105 Diverter Valve,
Gas Storage
1106 Pressure Trans-
ducer, Gas
Storage
1101-2 Tank, N 2 Gas
Storage
1102 Flow Restrictor,
Gas Storage
Rupture, Leakage
Clog, Leakage
Open, Close
Failure to Connect;
Failure to Dis-
connect
Failure to Actuate
Rupture Leakage
Clog, Leakage
1103 Shutoff Valve, Fail Open;
Gas Storage Fail Closed
Loss of 02 for com-
partment repressuri-
zation, airlock
makeup and PLSS
recharge
Same as 1101-1
Fail to open,
same as 1101-1
Same as 1101-1
Same as above if
manifold fails
(secondary fail-
ure)
Instrumentation
Experiment cur-
tailment, loss of
N2 for compartment
atmosphere
Same as 1101-2
Same as 1101-2
I
II/Il
II/HI
2,940
4 10, 000
4 1,870
4 6,600
4 1,870
4
II/Il
nann
280
8 2,940
8 10, 000
8 1,870
1104 Quick Discon-
nect, Gas
Storage
1105 Diverter Valve,
Gas Storage
1106 Pressure Trans-
ducer, Gas
Storage
Fail to Connect;
Fail to Disconnect
Failure to Actuate
Same as 1101-2 8 6,600
Same as 1101-2
None-Instrumentation
100 660
8 1,870 100 2,350
8 280 100
Prior
Subsystem
Component
(B)
Duty
Cycle
(%)
Criticality
Unit
(4380 hrs x
B/A x 10-6)
100 1,490
100 438
100 2,350
100 660
100 2,350
100 1,490
100 438
100 2,350
IaIn
3.3 MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS
Space Station maintenance concepts, in general, are discussed in Section 7.
The Environmental Control and Life Support (EC/LS) Subsystem represents
the largest maintenance workload and the greatest potential for commonality in
design for maintenance. The EC/LS Subsystem will, for the most part, be main-
tained at the component level, such as a fan or a valve.
Consideration has been given to electrical design approaches that allow
removal of electrical solenoids, transducers, etc., with complete isolation from
the pneumatic and/or fluid systems. Attach fittings permit easy removal and in-
stallation of devices with minimum use of screws and bolts.
Filter elements are designed to permit exchange without releasing liquids
or noxious gases. The electrolysis cell stack is designed to be repaired at a
module or subassembly level. If a single membrane fails, the entire module is
replaced. Tanks are replaceable and are of a size that will pass through the
passageways to the logistics docking port.
Two radiator control and two radiator recirculation assemblies are installed
in the forward pressurizable equipment deck and two each in the unpressurized
area between Decks 2 and 3. Both of these are maintainable in a shirtsleeve
environment.
Acceptable repair times are limited to 30 percent of the critical (maximum
possible) downtime to maximize the probability of repair. Note that critical down-
times for the EC/LS Subsystem will be very long, generally because of the two-
compartment design.
Downtime allowable includes time for recognizing and locating the problem,
isolation time, replacement/repair time, delay time in initiating maintenance,
recharge and/or restart time, and checkout time to determine if the system is
performing correctly.
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To minimize crew error, installation of replacement components or modules
is planned as one-way-possible positioning. Labeling and coding should be employed
liberally to aid maintenance.
System design will emphasize commonality to reduce the number and types
of spares and, thus, crew training requirements.
Maintenance ends ordinarily at the component level. However, consideration
will be given to possible emergency repairs below the component level by use of
standard parts where feasible.
Components shall be designed to be replaceable by one man. Modules, if
required, may be replaced by two men.
External (outside the vehicle) maintenance will be at a higher level than
internal maintenance (i. e., module, subsystem, or system rather than component
replacement).
Hazardous maintenance (atmospheric contamination) and external maintenance
(radiators) will be performed in a pressure suit, and subsystems are designed to
permit this kind of maintenance.
Components are isolated, removed, and replaced as follows:
* Low-Pressure Air Line - Simple clamp removal, no isolation required
* High-Pressure Gas - Manually operated, isolation valves
* Fluid Lines - Special low leakage, component bypass maintenance
disconnects
Small components can be removed and replaced simultaneously, with the
loss of a maximum of 0. 1 cc of water, by an installation tool that pushes the
replacement components into the manifold. The replacement component, in turn,
pushes the failed component into an empty sleeve. Large components are replaced
by using the installation tool (plug) to remove the component and plug the manifold.
All equipment deemed critical to Space Station operation is duplicated so that
cooling can be provided by either core module coolant water circuit. This system
redundancy, together with the large core module atmosphere volumes, generally
precludes the need for rapid fault isolation and repair.
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3.4 LINE REPLACEABLE UNIT ANALYSIS
General guidelines and criteria for the definition of LRUs were established
and these along with the maintenance philosophies reported in Section 3.3 were
used to determine at what level line maintenance would be performed. For the
Space Station Subsystems (less DMS) specific justification applicable to LRU
selection for the particular subsystem under examination was derived from the
guidelines and these justifications are presented along with the LRU listing. The
"functional LRUs" were then considered in the light of the standard electronic
packaging scheme and actual LRUs were defined and listed. The method employed
and the results achieved are discussed in the following sections.
3.4.1 SPACE STATION SUBSYSTEMS
The definition of Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) is keyed to repairing sub-
systems in an in-place configuration with the LRU being the smallest modular unit
suitable for replacement. General factors considered in identifying subsystem
LRUs include: (1) maintenance concepts developed and defined in Section 3. 3;
(2) the component-level failure rates delineated in the criticality analyses of
Section 3.1; (3) the amount of crew time and skill required for fault isolation and
repair; (4) resultant DMS hardware and software complexity; and (5) subsystem
weight, volume, location, and interchangeability characteristics. Listings of
LRUs and more specific justification for their selection follows.
A partial list of LRUs for the Environmental Control and Life Support (EC/
LS) Subsystem is provided in Table 3-3 as an example. Replacement is at the
component level primarily for efficiency of sparing and maintenance. It is at the
component level where: (1) EC/LS elements are expected to require periodic
replacement, (2) the number of EC/LS functions interrupted when maintenance is
performed is acceptable, (3) only conventional tools are required, and (4) normal
fabrication breakpoints exist. Lower level replacement would cause a dispro-
portionate increase in instrumentation and in the complexity of tools and skills
required. Higher level replacement would result in increased spares weight and
volume due to a decrease in commonality of spares. For the EC/LS Subsystem,
component-level LRUs offer a good compromise for the advantages and dis-
advantages of lower and higher level replacement.
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Table 3-3.. Environmental Control and Life Support
Quantity
LRU Required StadundantRedundant
High Pressure Gas Tank 12
Flow Restrictor 30
Shutoff Valve, Solenoid W Manual OR 27
Quick Disconnect 95
3-Way Valve, Electrically Operated 34
Electric Heater 20
Pressure Regulator with Relief 2 2
Pressure Control 1 1
02 Sensor 1 1
3-Way Valve, Pressure Actuated 1 1
Shutoff Valve, Manual 275
Relief and Dump Valve 2 2
Low Pressure Tank 9
Pressure Regulator 5
Compressor 9
Heat Exchanger, Liquid to Gas 2
Check Valve 40
Air Bypass Valve 2
Fan 20
Pump 33 7
Condensing Heat Exchanger 8
Temperature Controller 7
Temperature Sensor 8
Adsorption Cannister 19
CO2 Sensor 8
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Section 4
OCS CHECKOUT STRATEGIES
4.1 SUBSYSTEM CHECKOUT STRATEGY
Before further requirements analysis, it is necessary to develop a checkout
strategy for all Space Station subsystems to meet checkout objectives, which can
be summarized as follows:
* To increase crew and equipment safety by providing an immediate
indication of out-of-tolerance conditions
* To improve system availability and long-life subsystems assurancy
by expediting maintenance tasks and increasing the probability
that systems will function when needed
* To provide flexibility to accommodate changes and growth in both
hardware and software
* To minimize development and operational risks
Specific mission or vehicle-related objectives which can be imposed upon
subsystem level equipment and subsystem responsibilities include the following:
* OCS should be largely autonomous of ground control.
* Crew participation in routine checkout functions should be minimized.
* The design should be modular in both hardware and software to
accommodate growth and changes.
* OCS should be integrated with, or have design commonality with,
other onboard hardware or software.
* The OCS should use a standard hardware interface with equipment
under test to facilitate the transfer of data and to make the system
responsive to changes.
* Failures should be isolated to an LRU such that the faulty unit can be
quickly removed and replaced with an operational unit.
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* A Caution and Warning System should be provided to facilitate crew
warning and automatic "safing" where required.
* Provisions must be included to select and transmit any part or all of
the OCS test data points to the ground.
To attain these objectives via the use of an Onboard Checkout System which
is integrated with the Data Management System, checkout strategies have been
developed which are tailored to each Space Station subsystem.
Special emphasis has been applied to a strategy for checkout of redundant
elements peculiar to each subsystem. The degree to which each of these
functions is integrated into the DMS is also addressed.
4.1.1 SPACE STATION SUBSYSTEMS
Each major Space Station subsystem was examined with respect to the re-
quired checkout functions. The checkout functions associated with each subsystem
are identified and analyzed as to their impact on the onboard checkout task. The
functions considered are those necessary to verify operational status, detect and
isolate faults, and to verify proper operation following fault correction. Specific
functional requirements considered include stimulus generation, sensing, signal con-
ditioning, limit checking, trend analysis, and fault isolation.
4.1.1.1 Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem
The Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem (EC/LSS) is perhaps
the most critical of the onboard subsystems in that its proper operation is essential
to the habitability of the Space Station and to the lives of the crew. The subsystem
therefore features a high degree of reliability which is achieved through conserva-
tive design and through redundancy and backup provisions. Major elements of the
subsystem are the atmosphere supply and control, atmosphere reconditioning,
water management, waste management, IVA/EVA, and thermal control systems.
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4.1.1.1.1 Checkout Functions
The EC/LSS is a mechanical and chemical subsystem and as such involves
some rather unique checkout and fault isolation considerations. Probably the most
apparent of these is the extremely wide spectrum of sensing requirements. These
range from the relatively common, such as voltage, temperature, and pressure,
to the uncommon which include PH factor and conductivity of water. Other signifi-
cant characteristics of the subsystem from the checkout standpoint are its large
size, wide physical distribution, and its complexity.
The subsystem performance parameters, (pressure, temperature, flow,
quantity, etc. ) are predominatly analog in nature and are associated with con-
tinuous process operations rather than events. Such parameters lend themselves
well to limit checking as a means of status monitoring and fault detection, and this
technique is used extensively. Some trend analysis is also utilized to evaluate
performance of limited life items such as filters. Fault isolation is accomplished
primarily through combinatorial analysis of operating conditions.
* Stimulus Generation - No external stimuli other than those required for
operational control are required for checkout of the subsystem.
* Sensing - Detailed measurement requirements are included in
the Task 1 Final Report.
* Signal Conditioning - Many sensors will impose requirements for sig-
nal conditioning to convert their outputs to a form compatible with the
data acquisition equipment. The exact quantity and configuration will
depend upon the type of sensors selected, but may include strain gauge
and temperature probe conditioning, frequency to DC conversion, etc.,
plus scaling, amplification, and buffering circuitry. The required
circuitry is provided as an integral part of the sensor assemblies or
in associated electronics assemblies.
* Limit Checking - The EC/LSS involves a large number of fluid process
functions such as temperature and pressures which must be monitored
to assure the proper operation and safety of the subsystem. This re-
quirement leads to the extensive use of a limit checking technique.
The applicable limits include both absolute limits, such as those as-
sociated with safety, and operational limits which may vary in accord-
ance with particular operating modes or conditions. Certain parameters
have significant limits in both categories and therefore require a dual
limit check. The variable aspect of the operational limits necessitates
the capability for selectively altering the limit criteria in real time.
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In terms of data processing requirements the large number of limit
functions associated with the EC/LSS is offset to some extent by the
relatively low rates involved. The majority of these functions are
dynamically stable and are not subject to high rates of change. The
sampling rate may therefore be quite low (i. e., one iteration/second or
minute) even on the more critical functions which involve crew safety.
Detection of an out-of-limit condition in any of the EC/LSS parameters
will lead to some form of relief or corrective action, either automatic-
ally or by the crew. The nature of the required action will in some
cases be directly deducible, but more commonly must be determined
through fault isolation techniques. A typical situation will involve a
two-stage reaction, first to relieve the condition and then to correct it.
An example is the detection of a sudden pressure decay in a freon coolant
loop, indicating a possible rupture. Immediate and automatic action
would be taken to isolate the loop to minimize further loss of fluid.
This would be followed by automatic switchover to the alternate loop to
maintain thermal conditioning. Fault isolation precedures would then
be initiated to localize the problem and determine repair action.
* Trend Analysis - Trend analysis techniques will be utilized where ap-
plicable to accomplish predetection of potential failures or hazardous
conditions and as an aid to the detection and diagnosis of abnormal
conditions. Examples of predetection include monitoring of trace con-
taminants in the atmosphere to detect buildup trends and monitoring of
CO2 absorption bed moisture level to project useful life. The application
of trend data to fault detection and diagnosis is illustrated by the use of
nitrogen repressurization history to detect abnormal cabin repressuriza-
tion rates which may be indicative of a leak in the vehicle pressure
shell. Still another form of trend analysis is utilized in monitoring and
forecasting consumables usage as an aid to resource management and
resupply planning.
* Fault Isolation - Fault isolation will be accomplished primarily through
comparison of the operating system performance parameters with pre-
determined limits and by combinatorial analysis of input/output measure-
ments and related functions. Redundant element substitution will also
be utilized where applicable.
4.1.1.1.2 Redundant Element Checkout
The EC/LSS features a high degree of redundancy at both the functional and
LRU levels. Functional redundancy includes separate and independent forward
and aft compartment atmosphere supply and control, water management, waste
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management, and thermal control systems, each fully capable of supporting the
12-man crew. Crossover connections are provided between compartments to
permit assemblies in either compartment to serve as spares for those in the other
compartment. Lower level redundancy is provided in the form of parallel and/or
series redundant storage tanks, pressure regulators, pumps, valves, filters,
etc. In all cases the redundant systems/assemblies/components are isolatible by
valving or switching and are capable of being operated and tested as independent
elements. They therefore present no unique problems from the checkout stand-
point other than the requirement that they be exercised periodically if not normally
on line.
4.1.1.1.3 Integration with Data Management System
The data acquisition interface between the EC/LSS and the DMS is defined by
the measurement list in the Task 1 Final Report. Signal conditioning is provided
by the EC/LSS to convert the measurement sensor outputs to a standardized 0-20
mVdc, 0-5 Vdc, or 0-28 Vdc level. The DMS must provide the computation
capability necessary to apply calibration coefficients and convert to engineering
units. The DMS also provides the test control, sequencing, and fault isolation
logic.
4.2 INTEGRATED CHECKOUT STRATEGY
This analysis identifies the integrated checkout functions associated with
Space Station subsystems during the manned orbital phase of the mission. These
functions are depicted in Figure 4-1 and are those required to ensure overall
availability of the Space Station. Characteristic of integrated testing is the fact
that the test involves subsystem interfaces, and, therefore,' test objectives are
associated with more than one subsystem.
4.2. 1 INTEGRATED STRATEGY
Six checkout functions have been identified:
* Caution and warning * Trend analysis * Periodic checkout
* Fault detection * Operational status * Fault isolation
These functions represent a checkout strategy of continuous monitoring and
periodic testing with eventual fault isolation to a line replaceable unit (LRU).
Under this aspect the functions are grouped as -
CONTINUOUS MONITORING PERIODIC TESTING FAULT ISOLATION
* Caution and warning * Automatic tests · Localize to SS
* Fault detection * Operational * Isolate to RLU
* Trend analysis Verification
* Operational status
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General characteristics of these groups are defined below:
4.2.1. 1 Continuous Monitoring
Continuous monitoring is not a test per se. It is a concept of continuously
sampling and evaluating key subsystem parameters for in/out-of-tolerance con-
ditions. This evaluation does not necessarily confirm that the subsystems have
failed or are operating properly. The evaluation is only indicative of the general
status of the subsystems. For example, a condition exists where the integrated sub-
systems are indicating in-limit conditions, but during the next series of attitude con-
trol commands, an error in Space Station position is sensed and displayed. Since
three subsystems, DMS, GN&C, and P/RCS, are involved in generating and
controlling the Space Station attitude, a "positional error" malfunction is not
directly related to a subsystem malfunction. The malfunction indication is only
indicative of an out-of-tolerance condition of an integrated function. Final resolu-
tion of the problem to a subsystem and eventually to LRU will require diagnostic
test-procedures that are separate from the continuous monitoring function.
There are situations in which the parameters being monitored are intended
to be directly indicative of the condition of a subsystem or an LRU. Examples of
these include tank pressures, bearing temperatures, and power source voltages.
However, even in these simpler cases when a malfunction is detected, an integrated
evaluation will be performed to ascertain that external control functions, transducers,
signal conditioning, and the DMS functions of data acquisition, transmission, and
computation are performing properly. This evaluation will result in either a sub-
stantiation of the malfunction or identification of a problem external to the param-
eter being monitored.
Figure 4-1 shows the logic associated with each function in the continuous
monitoring group, as well as the integrated relationships between these and the
total checkout functions. The caution/warning and fault detection functions are
alike in their automatic test and malfunction detection approaches, but are differ-
ent in terms of parameter criticality and malfunction reaction. The caution/warn-
ing function monitors parameters that are indicative of conditions critical to crew
or equipment safety. Parameters not meeting this criticality criteria are handled
as fault detection functions. Figure 4-1 shows that in the event of a critical mal-
function, automatic action is initiated to warn the crew and sequence the sub-
systems to a safe condition. Before this automatic action is taken, the subsystems
must be evaluated to ascertain that the failure indication is not a false alarm and
that the corrective action can be implemented. After the action is taken, the sub-
systems must be evaluated to determine that proper crew safety conditions exist.
Since automatic failure detection and switching can be integral to subsystem de-
sign (self-contained correction) and subsystems can be controlled by the operation-
al software or manual controls, it is imperative that the status of these events be
maintained and that the fault detection and correction software be interfaced with
the prime controlling software. For malfunctions that are not critical, the crew
is notified of their occurrence, but any subsequent action is initiated manually.
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The next continuous monitoring function, trend analysis, automatically ac-
quires data and analyzes the historical pattern to determine signal drift and the
need for unscheduled calibration. It also predicts faults and indicates the need
for diagnostic and fault isolation activities. An example of a parameter in this
category is the partial pressure of nitrogen. Nitrogen is used to establish the
proper total pressure of the Space Station. Since it is an inert gas, the only make-
up requirements are those demanded by leakage or airlock operation. The actual
nitrogen flow rate is measured, and calculations are performed which make
allowances for normal leakage and operational use. When these calculations
indicate a trend toward more than anticipated use, the crew is automatically
notified and testing is initiated to isolate the problem to the gas storage and
control equipment or to an excessive leak path. The historical data is not only
useful in predicting conditions but is also useful in providing trouble-shooting clues.
The data might reveal, for example, that the makeup rate increased significantly
after the use of an airlock. This could lead directly to verifying excessive seal
leakage.
The final continuous monitor function is in operational status. This function
is performed by the crew and is nonautomatic with the exception of the DMS com-
puter programs associated with normal Space Station operational control and
display functions. The concept of continuous monitoring recognized and takes
advantage of the crew's presence and judgment in evaluating Space Station per-
formance. In many instances the crew can discern between acceptable and un-
acceptable performance, and they can clearly recognize physically-damaged
equipment or abnormal conditions.
4. 2. 1. 2 Periodic Testing
As opposed to continuous monitoring, periodic testing is a detailed evalua-
tion of how well the Space Station subsystems are performing. Figure 4-1 shows
that periodic testing is not accomplished by any one technique. Rather, a com-
bination of operational and automatic test approaches is employed. The actual
operational use of equipment is often the best check of the performance of that
equipment. Operation of Space Station equipment and use of the normal operating
controls and displays will be used in detecting faults and degradation in the sub-
systems. This mode of testing is primarily limited to that equipment whose
performance characteristics are easily discernible, such as for motors, lighting
circuits, and alarm functions.
Automatic testing is performed in two basic modes:
* With the subsystems in an operating mode, the DMS executes a diagnos-
tic test procedure which verifies that integrated Space Station functions
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are being properly performed under normal interface conditions in
response to natural or designed stimulation. This mode of testing
allows the evaluation of Space Station performance without interrupting
mission operations.
* For those situations where the integrated performance or interface
compatibility between subsystems cannot be determined without known
references or control conditions, the DMS will execute a diagnostic
procedure in a test mode. In this mode, control, reference, or bias
signals will be switched in or superimposed on the subsystems to allow
an exact determination of their performance or localization of problem
between the interfaces. Since the test mode may temporarily inhibit
normal operations, the DMS must interleave the test and operational
software to maintain the Space Station in a known and safe configuration.
The scheduled automatic tests are performed to verify availability or proper
configuration of "on-line" subsystems, redundant equipment, and alternate modes.
* Periodic Verification of "On-Line" Subsystems - The first checkout
requirement is a periodic verification that on-line subsystems are
operating within acceptable performance margins. The acceptable
criteria for this evaluation is based on subsystem parameter limits and
characteristics exhibited during Space Station factory acceptance or
pre-flight testing. The rejection criteria and subsequent decision to
repair or reconfigure subsystems is based on the criticality of the
failure mode. If the subsystems appear to be operating properly, but
the test clearly indicates an out-of-tolerance condition, then one of the
following alternatives must be implemented:
- If the failure mode is critical, the crew normally takes immediate
action to isolate and clear the problem.
- If the failure mode is not critical, the crew can take immediate
action, schedule the work at a later time, or wait until the condi-
tion degrades to an unacceptable level.
* Redundant Equipment Verification - A second checkout requirement is
verifying that standby, off-line, or redundant equipment and associated
control and switching mechanisms are operable. The acceptable/re-
jection criteria for these evaluations is identical to those for normally
operating equipment. A primary distinction of this function is that
equipment may have known failures from previous usage or tests. This
situation occurs when the crew has knowledge of a failure but has not
elected to perform the necessary corrective action. The checkout
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function then becomes one of equipment status accounting and main-
tenance/repair scheduling. The status information is interlocked with
mission procedures and software to preclude activation of failed units
while they are being repaired or until proper operation following repair
is verified.
e Alternate Mode Verification - The third checkout function is verifying the
availability of alternate modes of operation. This function is essentially
a confidence check of the compatibility of subsystems'interaction and
performance during and after a change in the operating mode. To some
extent this function overlaps with redundant equipment verification, but
is broader in scope in that it verifies other system-operating character-
istics. For example, some modes will involve manual override or
control of automatic functions or automatic power-down sequences.
4.2. 1. 3 Fault Isolation
Fault isolation to an LRU is a Space Station goal. As shown in Figure 4-1,
fault isolation testing is initiated when malfunction indications cannot be directly
related to a failed LRU. The integrated test functions associated with fault isola-
tion are localizing a malfunction to a subsystem or to an explicit interface between
two subsystems and identifying the subroutine test necessary for LRU isolation.
In structuring this relationship between integrated subsystem tests for fault local-
ization and subroutine tests for fault isolation, the DMS, in conjunction with the
test procedure documentation, must establish an effective man-machine interface
so that in the event of an unsolved malfunction the crew will be able to help evalu-
ate the condition and determine other test sequences necessary to isolate the
problem. To accomplish this requirement, the DMS must be capable of displaying
test parameters and instructions in engineering units and language and be capable
of referencing these outputs to applicable documentation or programs that correl-
ate test results to corrective action required by the crew.
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Section 5
ONBOARD CHECKOUT TEST DEFINITIONS
5.1 SUBSYSTEM TEST DEFINITIONS
The on-orbit tests required to insure the availability of the Space Station
subsystems are defined herein. Also delineated are the measurement and stimu-
lus parameters required to perform these tests. Two discrete levels of testing
are defined, i.e., continuous status monitoring tests for fault detection of critical
and noncritical parameters, and subsystem fault isolation tests for localization of
faults to a specific Line Replaceable Unit. In addition to these two levels, tests
are defined for periodic checkout and calibration of certain units, and parameters
requiring analysis of trends are defined.
The software module approach to DMS checkout makes it necessary to
estimate the CPU time and memory required to implement these modules, along
with an assessment of the services required from an Executive Software System
to control the checkout.
These test descriptions, measurements, and stimulus information provided
for each subsystem, and the software sizing information provided for the Data
Management System provide the data required to estimate the checkout impact on
the DMS software and hardware. Table 5-1 is a summary of the measurement
and stimulus requirements for the Space Station.
The Environmental Control and Life Support (EC/LS) Subsystem provides
the atmosphere supply and control, atmosphere reconditioning water management,
waste management, and thermal control functions for the Space Station, including
the IVA/EVA Systems. Proper operation of the subsystem is essential to the
habitability of the Space Station and to the lives of the crew. The subsystem
therefore features a high degree of reliability which is achieved through provision
of redundancy and backup operating modes.
The EC/LS Subsystem normally operates in an automatic closed-loop mode
under overall supervision of the Data Management System (DMS). An important
function of the DMS will be to maintain a vehicle mass balance to project expend-
ables use rates and to identify equipment which is not reclaiming oxygen and water
at the required efficiency. The measurement/stimulus list for the EC/LS is given
in the Task 1 Final Report.
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5.1.1 STATUS MONITORING
Status monitoring instrumentation is provided for major parameters which
reflect performance and operational status of the subsystem. Any appreciable
degradation of subsystem performance is detected by limit checking. Depending
upon the nature of the fault the crew receives a normal malfunction notification or
a caution or warning alarm. Caution pertains to a condition of station degrada-
tion where some station activities may be curtailed. A warning is given when life
critical systems are involved and the crew is in immediate danger.
Fault detection acceptance or rejection criteria are based on historically
or analytically derived definitions of normal operation. Each individual fault
detection parameter must be considered separately and acceptance or rejection
criteria selected which accurately reflect performance. Limits on acceptance
criteria are made sufficiently broad to avoid premature or erroneous fault warnings,
yet with adequate margin to avoid the development of hazardous conditions.
Normally, not all the EC/LS equipment is operating at a given time and an
inventory of on-line assemblies must be kept by the DMS. This inventory is re-
quired to condition limit checking and other fault detection procedures so as to
prevent false malfunction warnings for shutdown equipment. Also, EC/LS
assemblies which operate in a cyclic mode possess parameters which vary greatly
over the cycle. Provisions must therefore be made for conditioning the tests of
these parameters with the normal for that point in the cycle.
5.1.2 TREND ANALYSIS
Trend analysis is utilized for functions which are subject to performance
degradation of known and measurable characteristics. These include electrolysis
cells, reverse osmosis membranes, adsorption beds, and evaporator wicks.
By observing the change in the major performance parameters, component re-
placement can be scheduled at a convenient time for the crew. Hazardous
conditions can be avoided by trend analysis prediction of out-of-tolerance con-
ditions. Trend analysis is also used to monitor expendable use rates. This pin-
points locations of excessive expendables use rates indicative of possible leakage
or other failures, and also provides a basis for resources management and re-
supply planning activities. An example of this application is the use of nitrogen
repressurization history to detect abnormal cabin repressurization rates which
may be indicative of a leak in the vehicle pressure shell.
5.1.3 PERIODIC CHECKOUT
The EC/LS is periodically checked out to determine its status at specific
periods in the mission. Checkout just prior to resupply is advantageous so that
any deficiencies can be identified and replacements can be included in the resupply
provisions.
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The general checkout sequence addresses the least dependent functional
group first. As an example, the thermal control equipment is checked out first
because its operation does not depend on other functional groups. However, many
other assemblies depend upon proper operations of the thermal control equipment.
By verifying thermal control, deficiencies due to inadequate heating and cooling are
eliminated as possible causes of deficiencies in EC/LS equipment. The sequence
for checkout of functional groups follows the sequence below.
1. Thermal Control
2. Atmosphere Supply
3. Atmosphere Reconditioning
4. Water Management
5. Waste Management
6. IVA/EVA
Sequencing within an assembly group follows the same general procedure;
the assemblies and LRUs which are least dependent are checked first. Where
applicable, test sequencing is established by combinational analysis requirements.
Only a portion of the LRUs will be operating at a given time during the
mission. Therefore, in order to accomplish checkout, stimuli will be provided
by the DMS to exercise the EC/LS.
Units on standby redundancy are checked out by switching operation from
the normally operating unit.
Acceptance or rejection criteria will consist of detecting on-off type
components which fail to operate or detecting equipment which falls short of
qualitative performance requirements. In some cases, on-off equipment is tested
for performance as well as actuation. An example is a shut-off valve which is
tested for actuation and for leakage. Leakage beyond allowable tolerance results
in degraded subsystem performance and is considered a fault. Tolerance bands
are chosen sufficiently broad to avoid premature fault identification and high
utilization of spares. In many cases, some performance degradation can be
tolerated in order to extract more life from components.
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5.1.4 FAULT ISOLATION
Once the fault detection function has identified an abnormality in the EC/LS,
tests are performed to identify the failure down to the LRU level. This entire
procedure can be performed by the DMS in nearly all cases. A major exception
is fluid and gas lines, where the exact location of a failure such as a blockage or
leak cannot in some cases be performed by inplace instrumentation. Portable
instrumentation and visual inspection procedures adapt readily to this application.
Fault isolation functions utilize much of the procedure software which is
used for the periodic checkout function. The major difference is that the fault
detection process has generally narrowed the failure location down to a small
portion of the EC/LS. The point of entry into the functional test procedure is
therefore determined by the malfunction indicated, and only that portion of the
test necessary to identify the failed LRU is executed. Following repair or re-
placement, proper operation is verified by retesting.
Another valuable fault isolation tool is the onboard crew member. His
powers of observation and reasoning in some cases enable him to detect and
isolate faults which may elude the efforts of an automated system or which are
difficult to detect by instrumentation, as in the case of fluid leakage. Planned
utilization of the crew for routine fault isolation will be minimized, however, due
to the limitations on available manpower resources.
A typical fault isolation flow is illustrated in Figure 5-1. This flow is initia-
ted upon detection of excessive CO2 in the cabin atmosphere and proceeds to isolate
the fault to the appropriate LRU or to determine the required corrective action.
5.2 INTEGRATED TEST DEFINITION
The task of ensuring overall Space Station availability is primarily dependent
upon the proper structuring of individual subsystem tests. The ability to test the
subsystems independent of other subsystems is directly related to the number and
types of interfaces. As shown in Figure 5-2, the DMS and Electrical Power Sub-
systems (EPS) interface with every other Space Station subsystem. In addition,
the EC/LS Subsystem provides cooling to most of the electronic packages.
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This situation demands that in constructing the test for a subsystem these inter-
faces be taken into account so that erroneous or ambiguous test results will not
be obtained. In other words, before detailed subsystem fault isolation tests are
initiated, a higher level of testing should be performed to verify that all interfaces
and Space Station conditions that influence the subsystem are proper. Properly
designed, these higher-level tests will (1) indicate what Space Station conditions
must be verified, maintained, or changed;'(2) localize the malfunction 'to a single
subsystem; and (3) identify the subroutine test necessary for fault isolation.
Since the DMS interfaces with all of the Space Station subsystems and is
used as the OCS, it would appear that all of the tests would be integrated. How-
ever, this is not a proper interpretation. When the DMS is used to verify the
performance of another subsystem, it must first establish itself as a test standard
against which the subsystem parameters are compared. Subsequent to this veri-
fication, the test is dedicated'to the evaluation of the subsystem. This test would
be considered as an independent test since the objective of the test was to verify
the subsystem and not the DMS. For a test to be considered as an integrated test
it must meet one or more of the following conditions:
e Test objectives associated with more than one subsystem
·* ~Test involves subsystem interfaces
e Test requires proper operation of other subsystems
In several cases, the DMS must simultaneously perform the dual role of
OCS and functional elements. As an example, the DMS has a functional interface
with the GN&C and Prop Subsystems for the computation of guidance equations and
the execution of commands to the control actuators. When this functional closed
loop is being tested, the DMS must, in addition to performing its normal functions,
execute the test routine. For this type of integrated test there must be an intrinsic
relationship between the operational and test software. This relationship must be
carefully considered in structuring the integrated tests since unstable or inter-
mittent performance may be detected only in the exact operating mode under
closed-loop conditions. The number of integrated tests is not extensive due to the
approach of minimizing the different types of interfaces between Space Station sub-
systems. For example, interfaces between the DMS and other subsystems are
largely standardized. As a result, relatively common tests can be designed for
verification of the multitude of DMS subsystem interfaces or for localization of a
fault to one side of a DMS subsystem interface. All special integrated tests that
have been identified are discussed in the following paragraphs. The GN&C/DMS/
PROP configuration for navigation and attitude control poses the most difficult
problem for on-orbit testing so it is presented in significant detail. Other inte-
grated tests are summarized.
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5.2.1 EC/LS - EPS ISOTOPE/BRAYTON INTERFACE
The Environmental Control/Life Support (EC/LS) Subsystem interfaces with
the EPS Isotope/Brayton System for removal of waste heat via a fluid heat ex-
changer installed in the Brayton Power Conversion System. It is planned that flow
rate, temperature, and pressure parameters be continuously monitored on both
sides of the interface as part of normal EPS and EC/LS Subsystem checks.
5.2.2 EC/LS - LOW-THRUST PROPULSION INTERFACES
The EC/LS Subsystem interfaces the low-thrust portion of the Propulsion
Subsystem to supply unreacted CO2 from the CO02 removal assembly, methane by-
products from the CO2 conversion assembly, and excess water. The Propulsion
Subsystem uses these biowaste fluids in the Low-Thrust System as propellant.
The interface is controlled by the DMS or by manual control to satisfy such para-
meters as propellant and pressurant selection. These parameters are primarily
a function of impulse requirements and available stores. Checkout of the interface
is required to verify proper valve and pump operation for the transfer of the waste
gases and excess water.
5-9/5-10
Section 6
SOFTWARE
6.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The recommended software checkout startegy involves a sequence of
detecting faults, isolating faults to a failing LRU or LRUs, and reconfiguring the
system to continue operation while the failures are being repaired.
This recommendation was developed by evaluating each subsystem with
respect to the three general requirements of fault detection, fault isolation, and
reconfiguration.
Fault detection incorporates both the recognition of failure occurrence, and
the prediction of when a failure can be expected to occur. The Remote Data
Acquisition Units (RDAUs) continually check selected test point measurements
against upper and lower limits, and notify the executive on an exception basis when
a limit is exceeded. This approach avoids occupying the central multi-processor
with the low-information task of verifying that measurements are within limits.
Trend analysis is a fault detection technique recommended for predicting the
time frame during which a failure can be anticipated. Data is acquired on a basis
of time or utilization, and compared with previous history to determine if a "trend"
toward degraded performance or impending failure can be detected.
Another checkout requirement evaluated for each subsystem is periodic
testing. This type of test is provided to exercise specific components at extended
time intervals or prior to specific events, to assure operational integrity. In the
event that a failure is detected, the periodic test will isolate to the failing Line
Replaceable Unit (LRU) and accomplish recertification after a repair operation.
Calibration of specific subsystem components will be required periodically,
or subsequent to a repair and/or replace operation. The techniques involved are
unique to the individual component; and, in some cases, require the acquisition of
operational data.
Fault isolation is required when a fault is detected. When a particular fault
provides an indication that a life critical failure has occurred, the fault isolation
routines are automatically initiated. If the failure does not represent an immediate
danger to the vehicle occupants, the crew is notified and they will initiate the fault
isolation modules at their convenience.
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The basic requirements of the fault isolation function is to analyze the avail-
able information relevant to a problem, and identify the LRU which is responsible
for the anomaly.
Three basic approaches to meeting this requirement were considered. These
are:
· Analyze each fault as an independent problem
· Analyze each fault with a state matrix which defines the possible error
states of the subsystem
* Associate each fault with a specific subsystem, and evaluate that
subsystem in detail
The third approach was selected on a basis of software commonality and cost
effectiveness. The complexity associated with the testing can be reduced by locali-
zation of the logic associated with the analysis of the subsystem in a unique package.
The software commonality will result in reduced software development and main-
tenance costs, while increasing the reliability of the software.
The fault isolation software is structured modularly for compatibility with
the hardware structure of the subsystem. Checkout modules evaluate the per-
formance of a specific portion of the subsystem. A convenient division for this
modular structure is at the assembly level or functional area. A program module
which can determine and control the sequence in which these checkout modules are
executed is also required for each subsystem.
Subsequent to fault detection, the software associated with the subsystem
which is most likely to contain the error will be activated.
The subsystem software will analyze the error indication, and initiate a
sequence of checkout modules to isolate the problem. If successful, the crew is
notified regarding the Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) to be replaced. If an error
cannot be identified, the crew is informed of the situation and has an option to
execute the periodic test of the subsystem.
After a fault has been isolated, reconfiguration software restores the
functional capability of the subsystem. This is most commonly accomplished by
exchanging a redundant element for the failing unit, or by defining an alternate
path to accomplish the required function.
The Task 2 Final Report of the basic onboard checkout techniques study
provides descriptions of the software requirements, definitions and design in
addition to detailed flow charts of specific checkout routines.
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6.2 SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS
The Environmental Control/Life Support (EC/LS) Subsystem provides cabin
atmosphere control and purification, water and waste management, pressure suit
support, and thermal control for the entire space station.
The fault detection functions required for the EC/LS Subsystem is accomplished
by tables which are monitored by the OCS executive program. The tables contain
the parameters which must be monitored to assure subsystem performance. These
tables are transferred to the Remote Data Acquisition Unit (RDAU) via the master
executive program and exception monitoring is accomplished. Figure 6-1 provides
a graphic description of this function.
Initiation of the periodic checkout function is accomplished as the result of a
keyboard entry by a crew member. It is anticipated that periodic checkout will be
accomplished just prior to resupply, so that required replacements can be included
in the resupply provisions.
Fault isolation utilizes the same software modules as the periodic checkout;
however, it is anticipated that analysis of the detected error will permit selection
of the appropriate module to begin the required fault isolation. If the error is not
detected in the selected assembly, the program provides this information and
recommends that the periodic test be executed.
Six specific functional areas of this subsystem require automated checkout,
as follows:
· Thermal Control
e Atmosphere Supply and Control
· Atmosphere Reconditioning
* Water Management
* Waste Management
* IVA/EVA
Figure 6-2 provides a block diagram of the functional areas of this subsystem.
6.2.1 SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
6. 2. 1.1 Subsystem Definition
This program specification is based upon the subsystem definition given in
the Task 1 Final Report. Some test points in this subsystem are currently defined
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Figure 6-1. Fault Detection Logic
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Table 6-1. EC/LS Fault Detection Summary
I TOTAL PER DAY 20,709,720
* Only during IVA/EVA Activity
at the assembly level, and consequently every failure which is detected cannot
currently be identified with a Line Replaceable Unit (LRU). Also, the correlation
between the assembly test points identified in the "Subsystem Test Descriptions
and Measurement Stimulus List" and the LRUs identified in the "Line Replaceable
Units Definition" is not always apparent.
6.2.1.2 Thermal Control Assembly Group
There are no test points defined to permit exchange of active and redundant
elements under control of the computer. The existence of such test stimuli is
required for execution of the periodic test.
6. 2.1.3 Water Management Group
The Urine Recovery assembly in the Water Management assembly group
requires a test point to open and close the solenoid valves which are associated
with the chemical injector.
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Sample
Assembly S Rate 1/SEC 1/MIN 1 / HOUR
Group _
ATMOSPHERE SUPPLY 50
WATER MANAGEMIEN 22 8
THERIM\A L CONTROL 68
WASTE MANAGEMENT 8
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ATMOSPE:-RE RECONDITIONING 60
PER SFCOND 228
PER MINUTE 13600 8
PER HOUTR 820,800 480
PER DAY 20, 699,200 10 520
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6. 2.1.4 Waste Management Assembly Group
A test point is required to determine the fecal collection seal cover position.
The measurement stimulus list has been modified to omit status monitoring of the
fecal container pressure.
A test point is required to provide the position of the selector valve.
A test point is also required to determine the position of the handle which
indicates the operate and process phases.
6. 2.1.5 IVA/EVA Assembly Group
Flowcharts were not developed for this subsystem.
6.2.1.6 Trend Analysis
Trend analysis is utilized for functions which are subject to performance
degradation of known and measurable characteristics. These include electrolysis
cells, reverse osmosis membranes, absorption beds, and evaporator wicks. By
observing the change in the major performance parameters, component replace-
ment can be scheduled at a convenient time for the crew. Hazardous conditions
can be avoided by trend analysis prediction of out-of-tolerance conditions. Trend
analysis is also used to monitor expendable use rates. This pinpoints locations of
excessive expendable use rates indicative of possible leakage or other failures,
and also provides a basis for resources management and resupply planning activi-
ties. An example of this application is the use of nitrogen repressurization history
to detect abnormal cabin repressurization rates, which may be indicative of a leak
in the vehicle pressure shell.
Although the measurement and stimulus list has identified those points which
require trend analysis, the required algorithms have not been specified. Conse-
quently, the trend analysis requirements could significantly impact the estimates
which are based on a least squares technique.
Table 6-2 has been included to provide an overview of the amount of trend
analysis which must be accomplished.
6.2.2 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The general checkout sequence addresses the least dependent functional
group first. The thermal control equipment is checked out first because its oper-
ation does not depend on other functional groups. Many other assemblies depend
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Table 6-2. EC/LS Trend Analysis Summary
upon thermal control equipment outputs. By verifying thermal control, deficiencies
due to inadequate heating and cooling are eliminated as possible causes of problems
in the EC/LS equipment. The checkout of functional groups follows the sequence
below.
a Thermal Control
* Atmosphere Supply
· Atmosphere Reconditioning
* Water Management
* Waste Management
* IVA/EVA
Sequencing within an assembly group follows the same general procedure;
when the assemblies and LRUs which are least dependent can be identified, they
are checked first.
6. 2. 2. 1 Thermal Control Module
The function of the thermal control assembly group is to collect, transport,
distribute, and reject space station heat such that the crew and equipment are
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AsBsembl Rate 1/MIN 1 /HOUR 1 /DAY
Group
Atmosphere and Control 4 24
Water Management 8 48 4
Thermal Control 8
Waste Management
IVA/EVA
AtmosDhere Recondition 7 32
Data Item/Min 19
Data Item/Hour 1, 252
Data Item/Day 30, 052
maintained within the required temperature limits. This program module issues
stimulus and monitors test points to assure the effectiveness of this operation.
The inputs to this module are the test points associated with specific assem-
blies. The assemblies which are examined to assure the quality of thermal
operations include:
· Heating water circuit control assembly (Isotope/Brayton only)
· Heating water recirculation assembly (Isotope/Brayton only)
* Coolant water control assembly
* Coolant water recirculation assembly
* Radiator control assembly
· Radiator recirculation assembly
The outputs from this module are the normal operational messages indicating
the out-of-tolerance situations and progress of the testing.
The condition of the thermal control assembly group is evaluated by software
examination of the temperature and flow rates of coolant water and Freon. * If
these measurements are within limits, the remainder of the tests are bypassed
for purposes of fault isolation.
The periodic test performs the following tests on each assembly group in
sequence.
1. The Heating Water Circuit Control Assembly controls the passage of
water through the heat exchangers. This program module is capable
of isolating faults which occur in the heat exchangers and relief valves.
2. The Checkout Requirements for the Heating Water Recirculation Assem-
bly are essentially identical to those for the radiator recirculation
assembly.
3. The Coolant Water Control Assembly is used to determine the required
flow rate based on heat loads within the circuit. Fault isolation to the
temperature sensors and the controller can be accomplished by this
program module.
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4. The Coolant Water Recirculation Assembly is used to maintain the flow
and pressure rates within the system. The software module which
checks out this assembly is capable of isolating problems in the pump
and accumulator.
5. The Radiator Control Assembly includes the valves and associated con-
trols for radiator selection and isolation purposes. The software module
associated with this assembly is capable of detecting faulty operation of
the isolation and flow reversal valves. There are two assemblies per
module, and two complete circuits within each assembly. This configu-
ration provides the capacity to maintain two circuits in an active state,
and two circuits in a redundant status.
6. The Radiator Recirculation Assembly performs a function similar to
the coolant water recirculation assembly for the Freon in the system.
The basic difference is that the pump rate is not controlled by the
radiator control assembly. Two additional test points have been pro-
vided to permit the sequence to check the Freon temperature and flow
rates. This checkout program module is capable of isolating problems
in the pump and accumulator.
Trend analysis is used to evaluate trends which are developing based upon
the water and Freon temperature. The required algorithms to accomplish this
analysis are currently undefined.
The replacement of the Isotope/Brayton power system with a solar array
power system impacts the thermal control assembly group in that the heating
water recirculation assembly and heating water control assembly are no longer
included.
6. 2. 2. 2 Atmosphere Supply and Control Module
The major functions of the atmosphere supply and control assembly groups
are:
* Provide oxygen and nitrogen
* Maintain atmosphere pressure and composition control
* Provide for compartmental pressurization and depressurization
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The inputs to this module are the test points associated with specific assem-
blies. The assemblies which are examined to assure the quality of the atmosphere
supply and control assembly group performance are:
· Dump and relief valve assembly
· Oxygen gas storage assembly
* Nitrogen gas storage assembly
· Pressure reduction assembly
· Airlock pump assembly
* Pumpdown accumulator assembly
* Airlock pumpdown pressure control assembly
* Docking port pumpdown pressure control assembly
The outputs from this module are the normal operational messages indicating
out-of-tolerance conditions, failing LRUs, and the progress of the listing.
The checkout of the atmosphere supply and control assembly group is accom-
plished by a group of program modules which meet the requirements for both
periodic checkout and fault isolation. The assemblies were divided into groups of
associated assemblies as depicted in Table 6-3. The pressure group is primarily
responsible for maintaining cabin pressure. Two systems supply the requirements
for the entire space station. The pump group interfaces with areas which require
repressurization and depressurization.
The checkout of both groups is accomplished on line by allocation of specific
elements.
If an error is detected in either of the areas which cannot be isolated to an
assembly, the failure is assumed to have occurred in the plumbing.
This program module begins execution by checking the Dump and Relief
Valve Assembly. This assembly prevents excess pressure being built up in a
compartment, and provides the capability to manually purge the atmosphere. The
dump and relief valve position is examined. An open status or excess pressure
reading is used as an indication of a pressure problem. The program begins to
examine the assemblies which are in the pressure group.
The Oxygen Gas S torage Assembly is used to store the oxygen used for the
compartmental atmosphere. For fault isolation the tank pressure and temperature
are limit checked and if in tolerance, the fault isolation logic proceeds to the next
assembly. If a test point is detected out-of-limits or the periodic test is being
executed, further analysis is performed.
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Table 6-3. Atmosphere Supply and Control Assembly Grouping
Pressure Group
Oxygen Gas Storage Assembly
Nitrogen Gas Storage Assembly
Pressure Reduction Assembly
Pressure Control Assembly
Dump and Relief Valve Assembly
Pump Group
Airlock Pump Assembly
Pumpdown Accumulator Assembly
Docking Port Pumpdown Pressure Control
Airlock Pumpdown Pressure Control
The Nitrogen Gas Storage Assembly accomplishes the same function for the
nitrogen gas as the Oxygen Gas Storage Assembly performs for the oxygen. Conse-
quently, the required software is identical to that required for the Oxygen Gas
Storage Assembly.
The Pressure Reduction Assembly is used to reduce the pressure of the
oxygen and nitrogen which is being taken from storage. The fault isolation portion
of this module limit checks the upstream and downstream pressures for both
oxygen and nitrogen. If these are within limits, this assembly is considered
operational. If a test point is detected out-of-limits, or the periodic test is being
executed, the shutoff valves, diverter valves, and heaters are examined.
The Pressure Control Assembly controls the supply of nitrogen to the cabin
and the pressure in the tunnel. This assembly requires that gas use rates be
available for display to the operator upon demand. In addition, the number of
actuations which are accomplished on the solenoid valve must be maintained for
purposes of trend analysis.
The pressure in the oxygen supply and cabin pressure are limit checked to
assure proper operation of this assembly. If either exceed limits or if a periodic
test is being conducted, the solenoid valves and cabin pressure control are also
checked out.
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The Airlock Pump Assembly is used to reclaim atmosphere from areas
which are operationally pressurized and depressurized. This reclaimed air is
then pumped to the Pumpdown Accumulator Assemblies.
The repressurization line pressure is checked for both periodic testing and
fault isolation. If this test point is in limit, the fault isolation test will proceed
to the next assembly. If an error is detected or the periodic test is being executed,
the solenoid valves and reciprocating compressor are examined.
The Docking Port and Airlock Pumpdown Pressure Control Assemblies are
used to control the rate of pressurization and depressurization of the respective
areas. This program module checks each docking port and airlock. The opera-
tional software has the responsibility for assuring that the proper limits are
maintained in the RDAU limit table, based upon the pressurization status of the
specific areas.
The Pumpdown Accumulator Assemblies are used to store air until it is
needed for repressurization. Each assembly is equipped with a shutoff valve to
isolate the equipment in the event of a failure.
The periodic and fault isolation tests both check the pressure and tempera-
ture in each assembly.
Trend analysis requirements for this module indicate that the executive must
collect tank temperature and pressure from the N2 and 02 supply tanks on an hourly
basis. In addition, the executive must maintain a count of the number of solenoid
valve actuations in the pressure control assembly.
6. 2. 2. 3 Other Modules
The foregoing descriptions should suffice as examples. A more complete
treatment is discussed in the Task 2 Final Report.
6.2.3 INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS
This program must interface with the master executive, the OCS Executive,
and the EC/LS Subsystem hardware. The EC/LS must also interface with the
following subsystems.
· Power Subsystem
d Structure Subsystem
* Propulsion Subsystem
e Data Management Subsystem
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The operator is required to communicate with the program to accomplish
the desired function. Specifically, the operator must initiate the program using
the system communication function. The program may be terminated prior to
completion by using the TERM system communication function.
In addition, when errors are detected, the operator is provided with options
to control program execution sequence. These options are referred to as GO-NO
GO options and permit the operator to retest the LRU which failed, resume program
execution, or to terminate program execution.
The operator must be capable of identifying the IVA and umbilical which are
associated with the particular pressure suits.
6. 2. 3. 1 Interface Diagrams
The interface between the EC/LS and other subsystems is depicted in
Figure 6-3. Table 6-4 reflects the interface between the EC/LS Subsystem
Checkout Program and the Executive Program.
Figure 6-4 is an example of the assembly interfaces which must be
considered.
6. 2. 3. 2 Detailed Interface Definition
6. 2. 3. 2. 1 Subsystem Interfaces
Power Subsystem - The electrical power subsystem supplies power to all
of the assemblies of the EC/LS subsystem requiring electrical power.
Structure Subsystem - The radiator tubes are integrated with frames of the
meteoroid shield. The EC/LS subsystem interfaces with the radiator at the inlet
and outlet mainfolds.
All EC/LS subsystem assemblies are mounted in the structure, and inter-
connecting plumbing and electrical wire harnesses are supported by the structure.
The EC/LS pumpdown system provides for pressurization and depressuriza-
tion of the EVA airlock, the forward tunnel, and the equipment bay.
Propulsion Subsystem - The EC/LS subsystem supplies unreacted C02 from
the C02 removal assembly to the propulsion subsystem. Excess water is also
transferred to the propulsion system.
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Data Management Subsystem - The data management and on-board checkout
subsystems provide displays of the operational status of the EC/LS subsystem,
provide spares and expendable inventory control for the EC/LS subsystem, and
provide displays for fault isolation and repair.
6. 2. 3. 2. 2 Executive Program Interfaces
6. 2. 3. 2. 2. 1 Input Processor
Keyboard Inputs - This program requires the capability to access parameter
information input by the operator from the keyboard to specify the selection of
programmed options.
6. 2. 3. 2. 2. 2 Output Processor
Measure Test Points - This program requires the capability to address
specific test points through the Remote Data Acquisition Units (RDAUs).
Issue Stimulus - This program requires the capability to issue stimuli to
specified test points.
Display Control - This program requires the capability to present data at a
display console to notify the operator of available options, or to present error
messages.
6. 2. 3. 2. 2. 3 Special Processor
Mode Control - This program requires the capability to have exclusive con-
trol over particular hardware components to accomplish required testing. This
requires the capability to allocate a component to the program, and to permit the
program to indicate a failure status on the device when an error is detected.
6. 2. 3. 2. 2.4 Miscellaneous
The IVA/EVA Assembly Group requires that the executive automatically
detect when a pressure suit is attached to the system.
The Atmospheric Supply and Control Assembly Group requires access to the
operational program which contains the algorithm used to determine the command
issued to the cabin pressure control mechanism.
The EC/LS Subsystem requires the capability to address test points which
are in a redundant capacity.
This subsystem requires direct interface (as opposed to data base inter-
faces) with the operational program modules.
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Section 7
MAINTENANCE
There are two aspects of maintenance which entered into the basic study.
Basic maintenance concepts were provided as part of the baseline resulting from
the Phase B Space Station study; they are discussed in subsection 7.1 below.
Additionally, one of the study tasks was aimed at implementation of an onboard
electronics maintenance capability. The results of that task are summarized
in subsection 7. 2.
7.1 BASELINE MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS
Maintenance concepts defined for Space Station subsystems are intended to
facilitate their preservation or restoration to an operational state with a minimum
of time, skill, and resources within the planned environment.
7.1.1 GENERAL SPACE STATION MAINTENANCE POLICY
It is a Space Station objective that all elements be designed for a complete
replacement maintenance capability unless maintainability design significantly
decreases program or system reliability. This objective applies to all sub-
systems wherever it is reasonable to anticipate that an accident, wearout, or
other failure phenomenon will significantly degrade a required function. Estimates
of mean-time-between-failure, or accident/failure probability, are not accepted
as prima facie evidence to eliminate a particular requirement for maintenance.
Should the accident/failure probability be finite, the hardware is to be designed
for replacement if it is reasonable and practical to do so.
As a design objective, no routine or planned maintenance shall require use
of a pressure suit [either EVA or internal vehicular activity (IVA)] . Where
manual operations in a shirtsleeve environment are impractical, remote control
means of affecting such maintenance or repairs should be examined. However,
EVA (or pressure suit IVA) is allowable where no other solution is reasonable,
such as maintenance of external equipment.
Time dependency shall be eliminated as a factor of emergency action insofar
as it is reasonable and practical to do so. This includes all program aspects of
equipment, operations, and procedures which influence crew actions. When time
cannot be eliminated as a factor of emergency action, a crew convenience period
of 5 minutes is established as the minimum objective. The purpose of the con-
venience period is to provide sufficient time for deliberate, prudent, and unhurried
action.
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7.1.2 ONBOARD MAINTENANCE FACILITY CONCEPTS
In addition to OCS/DMS capabilities, other onboard maintenance support
facilities provided on the Space Station include:
* Special tools for mission-survival contingency repairs such as soldering,
metal cutting, and drilling, as determined from contingency maintenance
analyses, although repairs of this type are not considered routine main-
tenance methods.
* Protective clothing or protective work areas for planned hazardous
maintenance tasks (such as those involving fuels, etc. ).
* Automated maintenance procedures and stock location data for both
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance and repair activities.
* Real-time ground communication of the detailed procedures, update
data, and procedures not carried onboard.
* Onboard cleanroom-type conditions by "glove box" facilities compatible
with the level at which this capability is found to be required.
* Maintenance support stockrooms or stowage facilities for spares
located in an area that provides for ease of inventory control and
ready accessibility to docking locations or transfer passages.
7.1.3 SUBSYSTEM MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS
Space Station subsystems utilize modular concepts in design and emplace-
ment of subsystem elements. Subsystem modularity enhances man's ability to
maintain, repair, and replace elements of subsystems in orbit. Providing an
effective onboard repair capability is essential in supporting the Space Station's
ten-year life span since complete reliance on redundancy to achieve the long life
is not feasible. The need for a repair capability, in turn, requires that a mal-
function be isolated to at least its in-place remove-and-replace level. The level
of fault isolation is keyed to the LRU, which is the smallest modular unit suitable
for replacement. The identification of subsystem LRUs is addressed as a
separate, but interdependent, part of the Onboard Checkout Study.
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Specific subsystem maintenance concepts, of course, depend upon examina-
tion of the subsystems. These concepts are discussed in subsequent subparagraphs.
General subsystem-related maintenance guidelines that have been established for
the Space Station are:
· It is an objective to design so that EVA is not required. However, EVA
may be used to accomplish maintenance/repair when no other solution
is reasonable.
* Subsystems will be repaired in an in-place configuration at a level that
is acceptable for safety and handling, and that can be fault-isolated and
reverified by the integrated OCS/DMS. This level of maintenance is
referred to as line maintenance and the module replaced to effect the
repair is the LRU.
e A limited bench-level fault isolation capability will be provided on the
Space Station, but is only intended for contingency (recovery of lost
essential functions beyond the planned spares level) or for development
purposes. Limited bench-level support is also provided in the form
of standard measurement capabilities which are used primarily to
reduce the amount of special test equipment required.
e Subsystem elements, wherever practical, will be replaced only at
failure or wearout. Limited-life items that fail with time in a manner
that can be defined by analysis and test will be allowed to operate until
they have reached a predetermined level of deteriorated performance
prior to replacement. Where subsystem downtimes for replacement or
repair exceed desirable downtimes, the subsystem will include backup
(redundant) operational capability to permit maintenance. Expendable
items (filters, etc. ) will be replaced on a preplanned, scheduled basis.
7.2 ONBOARD ELECTRONIC MAINTENANCE (STUDY TASK 3)
The objective of this task was to generate recommendations of supporting
research and technology activities leading to implementation of a manned electron-
ics maintenance facility for the Space Station. Early in the task it became apparent
that attention could not be confined to a central maintenance facility; it was neces-
sary to refocus the task to address implementation of an on-board maintenance
capability encompassing in-place as well as centralized maintenance activities.
The critical questions are the following:
e What is the optimum allocation of onboard maintenance functions
between in-place and centralized maintenance facility locations?
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e What is the optimum level of onboard repair (i. e., to line-replaceable
unit, subassembly or module, piece part, or circuit element)?
7.2.1 MAINTENANCE CYCLE
In order to place the task in the proper context, a generalized Space Station
electronic maintenance cycle is depicted in Figure 7-1.
A convenient place to enter the cycle is with detection of a fault ("In-Place
Maintenance" block). The fault is isolated to a Line Replaceable Unit (LRU). The
affected subsystem is restored to full capability by replacing the failed LRU with an
operable one from spares storage.
The failed LRU is taken to a maintenance facility (assumed for the moment
to have a fixed location in the Space Station) where it is first classified.as repair-
able or non-repairable. Classifications will likely be predetermined, and a listing
should be retained in the Data Management Subsystem. If the LRU is non-repairable,
it is placed in segregated storage. If the LRU is repairable on board, the fault is
further isolated to the failed Shop Replaceable Assembly (SRA). The LRU is then
repaired by replacing the failed SRA with one from spares storage. The repaired
LRU is then calibrated (if necessary), and its operation verified before it is placed
in spares storage.
Logistics requirements (replacement LRUs and SRAs needed) are transmitted
to ground-based logistics support functions by RF communications and/or Space
Shuttle. Failed units are taken away from and replacement units are delivered to
the Space Station by the Space Shuttle.
7.2.2 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The study confirmed and emphasized the necessity of onboard maintenance for
any manned mission of any complexity and duration measured in months (up to 10
years for Space Station). Formulation of recommendations for implementing such
a capability required consideration of other topics first, and achievement of
certain interim results. The principal conclusions of this study task are sum-
marized below. The analyses leading to them are explained in the Task 3 Final
Report.
* Prior studies and developments of in-space maintenance have empha-
sized justification of first-level (in-place) maintenance, fasteners, and
tools for space application and human factors criteria. Much less
attention has been devoted to test equipment, maintenance training, or
definition of shop level maintenance requirements.
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Figure 7-1. Space Station Maintenance Cycle
* The baseline subsystem descriptions, checkout requirements analysis,
and software requirements analysis indicate that approximately 60 per-
cent of all faults (over a long period) can be isolated to the failed LRU
automatically under software control, without crew intervention. In an
additional 27 percent of failure cases, fault isolation to one LRU can be
achieved by the crew using the onboard Data Management System as a
tool. In the remaining failure cases, additional fault isolation capabili-
ties are needed. This is a good result for a "first iteration" and can
probably be improved considerably with a modest effort to modify stim-
ulus and measurement provisions.
* Crew involvement in scheduled and unscheduled maintenance (including
participation in fault isolation) is estimated to average 7.2 manhours per
week over the total mission time. This estimate is most sensitive to
equipment reliability and levels at which onboard repair is performed.
It is affected little by the efficiency of automated fault isolation under
control of the Data Management Subsystem (DMS).
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* The recommended approach to maintenance in the baseline Space Station
is in-place removal and replacement of LRUs, without attempts to repair
LRUs onboard, if the resupply interval is less than nine months. Onboard
spares should be LRUs.
* For long resupply intervals or non-resupplied missions (as in a manned
interplanetary mission), in-place maintenance should be by removal and
replacement of LRUs. Repair of LRUs should be by removal and replace-
ment of Shop Replaceable Assemblies (SRAs). Onboard spares should be
SRAs.
* The Earth-orbital Space Station should include provision for development
of onboard maintenance capability and techniques applicable to long dura-
tion non-resupplied missions and/or the larger, more complex Space
Base.
* The baseline subsystem descriptions are at such a level of detail that
precise specification of onboard tools and test equipment is neither
feasible nor desirable. Anticipated needs identified qualitatively in the
study are: (1) a portable test module to supplement software fault isola-
tion as well as to assist mechanical adjustments and calibrator, (2) hand
tools for removal and replacement of electronic assemblies, (3) devices
for transporting and positioning spare assemblies, and (4) a central
maintenance/repair bench.
* Several tasks have been identified and recommended for future perfor-
mance, as part of a system study/design program or as separate
supporting research and technology tasks. The principal ones deal with
(1) development of a portable test assembly, (2) development of a repair/
test bench with special provisions for small parts retention and for de-
bris collection, (3) design for accessibility of test points and subassem-
blies, and (4) devices for transporting equipment within the Space Station.
The foregoing conclusions apply to the Modular Space Station as well as the
33-foot diameter, four-deck configuration.
The results of the study rest upon several assumptions and estimates,
derived wherever possible from related experience. The results are not sensitive
to small variations of the assumed or estimated values, except for equipment fail-
ure rates, which are most influential. Furthermore, it has not been practicable to
pursue all trade analyses to include all relevant factors. Nevertheless, the study
has generated valid insights into Space Station onboard maintenance and useful
visibility of the path to implementation of that capability.
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